Unfair Settlement Practice Acts: Should Legislators Expressly Create or Should Courts Imply a Private Cause of Action for Third Parties? by Sanders, Deborah F.
Unfair Settlement Practice Acts:
Should Legislators Expressly Create or
Should Courts Imply a Private Cause of
Action for Third Parties?
I. INTRODUCTION
One bright, spring day John drove to his neighborhood carryout as
he customarily did every week. He was driving with ordinary care when
James sped through an intersection and violently rear-ended John's car.
As a result of the accident, John suffered a severe head-and-neck injury,
a broken knee cap, and various cuts and bruises. Due to the severity
of his injuries, he can never resume employment as a truck driver.
During negotiations between John and James' insurance company
("the insurer"), the insurer's agent assured John that he would be
compensated for his injuries. The agent, however, refused to agree to
John's settlement demand and made no attempt to offer a reasonable
settlement figure. The agent refused to pay John's medical bills and
his claim for property damage prior to complete settlement or court
,adjudication. John retained an attorney to negotiate with the agent, but
the attorney was unable to settle the claim.
John and his attorney attempted to negotiate with the insurer for
nearly two years before filing a complaint against James for negligence.
The effects of the accident went beyond John's physical injuries. He
could not maintain the mortgage payments on his home or the payments
on the truck he used as a self-employed truck driver. Consequently, his
house went through foreclosure and his truck was repossessed. This sent
John into a state of deep depression and he has since been diagnosed
a manic depressive.'
While this example may be extreme, it illustrates the indirect damages
that can result from the bad faith conduct of an insurer which usually
are not recoverable from the original tortfeasor. If John were to receive
an award in excess of the policy limits, James would be able to sue
his insurer or assign his right to sue the insurer to John. John would
then be able to bring an action asserting that the insurer acted in bad
faith in carrying out its contractual obligations to James. In the above
illustration, however, many of John's injuries were suffered as a direct
result of the conduct of the insurer and not as a proximate result of
any negligence on the part of the insured.
1. This illustration is based upon knowledge gained through the author's employment
in a personal injury law firm.
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Most courts and state statutes do not allow third parties such as
John to maintain an action against the insurer for bad faith,2 and the
case that would have allowed such an action has been recently overruled.3
This Comment will explore the implications of this decision and discuss
the statutes addressing insurance bad faith issues in four sections. It
will: 1) examine the historical background of bad faith claims between
insureds and insurers; 2) discuss whether current legislation aimed at
eliminating unfair and deceptive settlement practices expressly provides
a private remedy to individuals injured by its violation; 3) discuss whether
the remedy, if provided by statute, extends to third parties; and 4)
discuss the status of case law implying or rejecting a third party private
cause of action based on unfair insurance practices acts. Finally, the
author will suggest legislative changes and alternative methods of en-
forcement of statutory provisions relating to unfair insurance practices.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON LAW BAD FAITH CLAIMS AND THE
ADVENT OF STATUTORY BAD FAITH CLAIMS
A. Background of Bad Faith Claims Against Insurers
Courts have long recognized that an insurer owes to its insured a
duty to respond to settlement offers in good faith.' The failure of insurers
to settle claims by or against the insured constitutes a breach of a
contractual duty.5 That duty includes a duty to act in good faith and
fair dealing.6 Where an insurer refuses to settle a claim against its
insured within the policy limits, the insured may be exposed to personal
liability exceeding those limits. In actions brought by insureds against
their insurers as a result of such exposure, courts have applied standard
of bad faith in determining whether the insurer breached its duty to
.the insured.7
Many jurisdictions recognize that an insured has a direct cause of
action for bad faith against his insurer.' Generally, however, a third
party does not have a direct cause of action against the insurer and
2. S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS § 6:09, at 18 (1984).
3. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 116 (1988).
4. S. ASHLEY, supra note 2 § 2:05, at 10.
5. Id. § 2:14, at 47.
6. Id.
7. Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1931); Crisci v.
Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
8. Salamey v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 741 F.2d 874 (6th Cir. 1984); Murphy v.
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 576 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 272, 452 N.E.2d 1315 (1983); Spadafore v. Blue Shield, 21 Ohio
App. 3d 201, 486 N.E.2d 1201 (1985); Clark v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 602 F. Supp.
995 (N.D. Tenn. 1984).
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must maintain his action through assignment of the insured's right to
sue.9 The assignment of interest generally results from the threat of an
award exceeding the policy limits of the insured. 0 Courts refused to
recognize a third party cause of action because at common law an
insurer had no contractual duty to a third party." The courts had to
reevaluate the duty of an insurer to a third party, however, when more
and more states enacted unfair settlement practice statutes.
B. History of Unfair Settlement Practice Legislation
The insurance industry enjoyed freedom from federal regulation for
over seventy-five years. 2 That freedom was threatened in 1944, when
the Supreme Court held that Congress could apply antitrust laws to
insurance companies." In an attempt to avoid federal regulation, lobbyists
persuaded Congress to pass the McCarran-Ferguson Act which declared
an indefinite moratorium on the applicability of antitrust laws to the
insurance industry. 4 Meanwhile, state insurance commissioners joined
forces and drafted the Model Act Relating to Unfair Methods of
Competition and Unfair and Deceptive Acts in Practices in the Business
of Insurance ("the Model Act.")"
9. S. ASHLEY, supra note 2 § 6:09, at 18; see generally Allen, Insurance Bad Faith
Law: The Need for Legislative Intervention, 13 PAC. L.J. 833 (1982).
10. Comment, Bad Faith: Limiting Insurers' Extra-contractual Liability in Texas, 41
Sw. L.J. 719, 721 (1987).
11. Krueger, A Royal Globe Should Exist in Hawaii's Legal Museum, 20 HAWAI
BAR J. 29 (1987); McCorriston & Ito, The Hawaii Courts Need Not Follow the Erroneous
California Decision in Royal Globe, 20 HAwAII BAR J. 33 (1987); Scroggins v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 74 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 393 N.E.2d 718 (1979).
12. S. ASHLEY, supra note 2 § 9:02, at 2.
13. Id. In Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (8 Wall.) (1868), the United States Supreme
Court determined that the business of insurance was not a part of commerce. The Court
reconsidered its position in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S.
533 (1944), and held that the antitrust statutes could be properly applied to insurance
companies.
14. S. ASHLEY, supra note 2 § 9:02, at 2-3. The solace the insurance industry has
found in the McCarran-Ferguson Act may be threatened by the American Bar Association's
House of Delegates decision to urged Congress to repeal the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Marcotte, Repeal Insurance Exemption?, 75 A.B.A. J. 32 (1989).
15. S. ASHLEY, supra note 2 § 9:02, at 3. The Model Act was drafted by The
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) in 1947 shortly after the passage
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. It is suggested that the Act was drafted in an effort to
escape federal regulation of the insurance industry. "The NAIC carefully drafted its
model act to delegate to the state insurance commissioners the same broad regulatory
powers over the insurance industry that Congress had delegated to the Federal Trade
Commission to regulate business generally." Id. The March, 1946 report of the Subcom-
mittee on the Federal Trade Commission Act reveals that the Subcommittee members
believed that "existing state laws must be strengthened if the business is to be in a
position to demonstrate that the states are adequately covering the field." The Subcom-
mittee was hopeful that the draft bill would provide "a basis for adequate and effective
regulation of unfair or deceptive trade practices." Proceedings of the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners 145-46 (1947).
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State legislators used the Model Act as a guideline when they enacted
similar statutes to address bad faith conduct of insurers. 6 Nearly every
state has adopted some version of the Model Act. 7 The Model Act
prohibits an insurer from engaging in certain conduct and practices,
and sets forth administrative procedures and remedies for its violation. 8
It does not, however, contain a provision allowing a private cause of
action by an individual. Although one commentator suggests that this
was an intentional omission, 19 the committee notes are not clear on this
issue?0 One can speculate that the drafters omitted the provision to
allow each state to decide whether a private cause of action would be
available. On the other hand, it may have been omitted to indicate that
the Model Act was to serve as a means of administrative enforcement
only. In view of the fact that lobbyists for the insurance industry were
successful in getting a moratorium on federal regulation of the industry,
it is possible that they were also successful in keeping out a provision
allowing a private cause of action.
Although no one knows whether the drafters of the original Model
Act intended to omit a private remedy from its provisions, the drafters
made it clear that the omission from 1971 revised Model Act was no
oversight.2 ' Regardless of the intent of the drafters of the Model Act,
states enacting unfair settlement practice statutes are not bound by the
language of the Model Act and may provide a private cause of action.
Some unfair settlement practice statutes allow an insured to bring a
private cause of action against an insurer?2 In a few states the class of
persons who have standing to bring such actions has been broadened
16. S. ASHLEY, supra note 2 § 9:02, at 4; see also Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co., supra note 3, at 297, 758 P.2d at 63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
17. See S. ASHLEY, supra note 2 § 9:02, at 4.
18. Id. at 3.
19. Id. § 9:03, at 6.
20. Carolyn Johnson, Assistant Counsel and Model Laws Coordinator of the NAIC,
indicated that the committee notes and minutes taken during the drafting of the Model
Act do not reveal the reason why the Model Act does not provide or prohibit a private
cause of action. While the committee notes clearly indicate that the state insurance
commissioners were empowered with enforcement, they do not reveal a specific intent to
deny a private cause of action. The Subcommittee introducing the bill indicated that it
did not intend the bill "to deprive the states of any powers which they now have or to
eliminate any penalties now provided for specific violations." In addition, the bill provided
that the powers given to the commissioners would be "in addition to any other procedures,
penalties, fimes or forfeitures authorized by law with respect to the methods, acts and
practices hereby declared to be unfair or deceptive." Proceedings of the National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners 149, 152 (1947). This would suggest that the NAIC
left any other remedies available for violations of unfair acts or practices to the state
legislatures.
21. When the NAIC revised the Model Act in 1971, it deleted a provision creating
a private cause of action. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins., 46 Cal. 3d at 299, 758
P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
22. S. ASHLEY, supra note 2 § 9:03, at 5.
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to include third parties.? For example, a Massachusetts statute specif-
ically grants an injured party, including a third party, a private cause
of action against an insurer for violation of its statute. 24 If a statute
does not expressly provide a private cause of action, most courts refuse
to imply that one exists.' These decisions are generally based on an
analysis of the legislative intent.2
In addition to the problems courts have in deciding whether to imply
a private cause of action, critics complain that unfair settlement practice
legislation lacks enforcement power. 7 Moreover, when statutes have
sufficient enforcement power, agencies have been criticized for failing
to use their enforcement power against violators.? Very few state in-
surance commissioners who have the power to enforce these statutes
have exercised that power to protect claimants from unfair settlement
practices. 9
To maximize protection against unfair settlement practices, legislation
must provide an adequate remedy to anyone adversely affected by the
bad faith conduct of an insurer. When a third party is precluded from
asserting a cause of action against an insurer, the third party may suffer
unrecoverable damages if he is unable to obtain an assignment from
the insured. The denial of the right to recover against an insurer for
its bad faith conduct would cause a third party to be victimized twice
as a result of one occurrence. First, the third party suffers injuries and
other damages as a direct result of the negligence of the insured. Second,
the third party may suffer emotional distress, possible financial collapse,
and other consequential damages as a direct result of the insurer's bad
faith. If the third party's injury from the negligence of the tortfeasor
does not warrant a judgment in excess of the policy limits, the misconduct
of the insurer may go unchallenged.
Courts recognize the cause of action for bad faith in order to protect
insureds from the risk of an insurer abusing its contractual obligations?
This rationale is reasonable in light of the insured's potential liability
23. Id. § 9:08, at 37.
24. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 93A, § 9(1) (1979).
25. See, e.g., Mavroudis v. State Wide Ins. Co., 121 A.D.2d 433, 503 N.Y.S.2d 133(1986); Bell v. League Life Ins. Co., 149 Mich. App. '481, 485, 387 N.W.2d 154, 156(1986); Kimpel v. Dairy Farm Leasing Co., Inc., C.A. No. WMS-86-8 (Ct. App. Ohio
Jan. 9, 1987).
26. S. ASHLEY, supra note 2 § 9:03, at 7.
27. Id. § 9:02, at 3. See also Hatch, 'Unfair Claims Practice Act' Creates Private
Cause of Action, MINN. TRIAL LAW., SPECIAL EDITION, 4 (1984). Since this article was
published, the Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled that the Minnesota Unfair Claims
Practices Act does not create a private cause of action. Morris v. American Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233 (1986).
28. S. ASHLEY, supra note 2 § 9:02, at 3.
29. Id.
30. Id. § 6:09, at 17.
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for awards exceeding the policy limits. However, any person who has
suffered as a result of an insurer's delay or refusal to pay a valid claim
deserves redress for such unfair tactics under statutes which prohibit
such conduct. Courts could accomplish this in several ways. Legislation
could provide a direct cause of action, or empower a state official such
as the insurance commissioner to bring an action on behalf of the injured
party either in court or before an appropriate administrative agency.
Legislation could also provide recovery of a certain percentage of a fine
assessed against an insurer for violations of the act."
Most state legislation neither expressly denies nor allows a private
right of action to third party litigants. One commentator suggested that
enacting a version of the Model Act with substantially all of its provisions
remaining is an indication that the state legislators "shared the intention
of the NAIC drafters of the Model Act." 2 Whatever the explanation,
states must come to grips with the litigious monster created by unclear
and indefinite statutes and revise the statutes with clear, unambiguous
language. At least three jurisdictions have chosen to deviate from a
strict adoption of the Model Act. The statutes in these states expressly
provide or prohibit a private cause of action under their unfair claims
settlement practice statutes. 3
III. STATUTES WHICH EXPRESSLY PROVIDE OR DENY A PRIVATE
CAUSE OF ACTION
A. Tennessee
Tennessee does not recognize bad faith as a cause of action at common
law,34 and Tennessee's unfair claim settlement practice statute expressly
denies any private cause of action.3 5 Hence, neither third parties nor
insureds who suffer damages resulting from the unfair conduct of insurers
have a private cause of action for bad faith under statutory law or
common law.
31. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-105(a) (Supp. 1988) which provides:
The insurance companies of this state ... in all cases when a loss occurs and they
refuse to pay the same within sixty (60) days after a demand shall have been made
by the holder of the policy ... shall be liable to pay the holder of said policy ...
in addition to the loss and interest thereon, a sum not exceeding twenty-five percent
(25%) on the liability for said loss; provided, that it shall be made to appear to the
court or jury trying the case that the refusal to pay said loss was not in good faith
and that such failure to pay inflicted additional expense, loss, or injury upon the
holder of said policy ....
32. S. ASHLEY, supra note 2 § 9:03, at 7.
33. TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-8-104(8) (Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.155(1)
(West Supp. 1989); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 93A, § 9(1) (1986).
34. Chandler v. Prudential Ins. Co., 715 S.W.2d 615 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986)
35. TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-8-104(8) (Supp. 1988) enumerates unfair claim settlement
practices. The statute provides that "the Commissioner shall have sole enforcement
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Although the statute precludes insureds and third party claimants
from suing an insurer for violations of the unfair claims settlement
practices, the statute assesses a maximum 25% penalty against insurers
for bad faith failure to pay.36 This penalty is payable to a holder of
the policy under which the failuie to pay is based. 37 In order to be
eligible to receive this money, the policyholder must establish that
additional expense, loss, or injury was incurred as a result of that failure
to pay.38 Thus, while insureds have no direct cause of action under the
statute or at common law, they are entitled to some measure of damages
resulting from the violation of the statute. No such corresponding
recovery is available to third party claimants.
The language of the Tennessee statute is a strong indication that
third parties are not the class intended to be protected by the statute.
Apparently, the legislators intended to preclude third parties or insureds
from asserting a cause of action against insurers for violating Tennessee's
unfair settlement practice act. Also, legislators apparently intended to
limit bad faith damages recoverable against insurers by insureds under
the statute and deny recovery by third parties.
Tennessee is unlike the majority of states which allow the tort of
bad faith to be brought against insurers. 39 Further, it is rare that a
legislative enactment clearly reveals the legislature's intent to deny a
private cause of action as is shown by the Tennessee statute.
B. Massachusetts
While Massachusetts expressly provides a private cause of action, it
does not do so through its unfair settlement practice statute.4° Chapter
93A of the General Laws of Massachusetts, however, which governs
the general conduct of insurers, expressly provides a private cause of
action for violation of that chapter.4' The original statute did not have
authority for this subdivision, and notwithstanding any other laws of this state, a private
right of action shall not be maintained under this subdivision."
36. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-105(a) (Supp. 1988).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See generally S. ASHLEY, supra note 2 § 2:05, at 9.
40. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 176D, § 3(9) (1986) enumerates unfair claim settlement
practices but does not provide a private cause of action.
41. MAsS. GEN. L. ch. 93A, § 9(1) (1986) reads in pertinent part:
Any person ... who has been injured by another person's use or employment of any
method, act or practice declared to be unlawful by section two or any rule or
regulation issued thereunder or any person whose rights are affected by another
person violating the provisions of clause (9) of section three of chapter one hundred
and seventy-six D may bring an action in the superior court, or in the housing court
... whether by way of original complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or third party
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such a provision. In Mahaney v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Co.,42 which was decided before chapter 93A was amended, the appellate
court of Massachusetts refused to imply a private cause of action based
upon that section.43 After the Mahaney decision, an amendment to
chapter 93A incorporated the unfair settlement practices section of
chapter 176D of the General Laws of Massachusetts." As a result of
that revision, courts were required to determine whether the new remedy
afforded by chapter 93A included a private cause of action for violation
of the unfair settlement practice statute. 45
Soon after the amendment, the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in
Van Dyke v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co.,' addressed the
issue of whether a third party had a statutory right to bring an action
for violation of the unfair settlement practice act.47 Van Dyke involved
a third party claim by a patient and his wife against a physician's
insurer. The plaintiffs had obtained a judgment against the physician
for negligence and filed a subsequent action against the physician's
insurer for unfair and deceptive settlement practices in handling their
claim. The plaintiffs did not prevail because they failed to establish
any injury as a result of the unfair or improper practice. The court
noted, however, that they had standing to bring the action based upon
section 9(1) of chapter 93A.4' The court acknowledged that the amend-
ment "substantially broadened the class of persons protected under the
statute" to include third parties. 9
C. Florida
Florida has also joined the list of the few states expressly providing
for a private cause of action against insurers violating the state's unfair
settlement practice act.50 Prior to enactment of Florida Stat. 624.155,
it was well settled that an insured could file a claim against an insurer
for failing to settle a claim by a third party if the court awarded
action, for damages and such equitable relief, including an injunction, as the court
deems to be necessary and proper.
42. 6 Mass. App. Ct. 919, 380 N.E.2d 140 (1978).
43. Id. at 920, 380 N.E.2d at 142.
44. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 93A, § 9(1) (1986).
45. Whitney v. Continental Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 939 (D. Mass. 1984).
46. 388 Mass. 671, 448 N.E.2d 357 (1983).
47. Id.
48. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 93A, § 9(1) (1986). The language is reproduced supra note
41.
49. 388 Mass. 671, 675, 448 N.E.2d 357, 360 (1983).
50. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.155(l) reads in part:
Any person may bring a civil action against an insurer when such person is damaged:
(b) By the commission of any of the following acts by the insurer:
1. Not attempting in good faith to settle claims when, under all the circumstances,
it could and should have done so, had it acted fairly and honestly toward its insured
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damages which exceeded the insured's policy limits." The insured,
however, could not proceed against his insurer for failing to settle the
insured's own claim.5 2
In Opperman v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,53 the plaintiffs
sued their insurer on the basis of section 624.155. The trial court
dismissed their complaint on the ground that a first party cause of
action against one's own insurer did not exist. In reversing the trial
court, the court of appeals indicated that the plain meaning of the
statute precluded the need for inquiry into the legislative intent to
determine whether the plaintiffs had standing.
Although the Opperman case was not a direct cause of action by a
third party claimant, it implies that the language in the statute would
allow a third party to bring an action against an insurer. The issue,
however, is not settled. The statute specifically indicates that the insurer
must act fairly and honestly "toward its insured."' This phrase could
be interpreted as the legislators' intent to extend the right to sue insurers
under the statute to the insured and not to third parties.
IV. IMPLYING A THIRD PARTY PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION
Tennessee, Florida and Massachusetts are examples of states which
have taken the path not chosen and have expressly provided or denied
a private cause of action for third parties under their unfair settlement
practice statutes. Most other state legislation is silent on the issue, and,
therefore, the courts must decide whether to imply a private cause of
action. Most courts have refused to imply a private cause of action.5
Even California, once the forerunner in implying a private cause of
action under the statute, has joined the majority."
A. Recognition of an Implied Private Cause of Action
Since the landmark decision of Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior
and with due regard for his interests .... Notwithstanding the provisions of the above
to the contrary, a person pursuing a remedy under this section need not prove that
such act was committed or performed with such frequency as to indicate a general
business practice.
FLA. STAT. ANN. 624.155(1) (West Supp. 1989)
51. Opperman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 515 So. 2d 263, 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987).
52. Id.
53. 515 So. 2d 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
54. FLA. STAT. ANN. 624.155(1)(b) (West Supp. 1989).
55. S. ASHLEY, supra note 2 § 9:03, at 7.
56. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 116 (1988).
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Court,57 courts in California have been split on whether to allow third
party causes of action against insurers. 8 Their dilemma has been re-
medied by the recent case of Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance
Co.,59 which explicitly overruled Royal Globe and denied that a private
cause of action exists under the California Unfair Insurance Practice
Act °
In Royal Globe, the California Supreme Court recognized an implied
cause of action against insurers who violate the state's unfair settlement
practice statute. It was the first case to recognize a third party private
cause of action under the statute.6'
The plaintiff in Royal Globe was a third-party claimant who filed
suit against several defendants which included the insurer, Royal Globe
Insurance Company, and the insured, a food market. The claimant
alleged bad faith against the insurer for failing to effectuate a prompt,
fair, and equitable settlement and alleged that Royal Globe's agent
violated the state's Unfair Practice Act by advising the claimant not
to obtain the services of an attorney. The defendants demurred to the
complaint and moved for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds
that: (1) the insurance commissioner had exclusive power to enforce
the provisions of the statute; (2) the legislature's intent was to protect
the interests of insureds only; and (3) the claimant could not sue the
insured and insurer at the same time.62
The court, although agreeing that the claimant could not sue the
insurer and the insured in the same action, held that the statute implied
a private cause of action for third party claimants as well as insureds.6
This decision was based on the court's interpretation of section 790.09
of the California Code, which provides that a cease and desist order
from the commission does not absolve insurers from "civil liability or
criminal penalty under the laws of this State arising out of the methods,
acts or practices found unfair or deceptive."" The court reasoned that
because the statute did not read "under any other laws of this State,"
anyone who had a claim against the insurer could enforce it by an
appropriate action under that statute. 65 The court refused to consider
57. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979), rev'd, 46 Cal. 3d 287,
758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
58. S. ASHLEY, supra note 2 § 9:03,'at 5-6; see generally Fowler, Statutory Third
Party Unfair Practice Suits Following Settlement: The Impact of Royal Globe's Conclusion
Requirement, 22 TORT AND INS. J. 640 (1987).
59. 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
60. Id. at 304-05; 758 P.2d at 68-69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126-27.
61. S. ASHLEY, supra note 2 § 9:06.50, at 21.
62. 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
63. Id.
64. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.09 (West 1979), quoted in 23 Cal. 3d at 885, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 845 (emphasis in original).
65. 23 Cal. 3d at 885-86, 592 P.2d at 333, 153 Cal Rptr. at 845-46.
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evidence offered by the defendant that the legislative intent was to
provide the commissioner with remedies against insurers and not to
provide a private cause of action."
The defendant then argued that the California statute should be
given the same construction as the Federal Trade Commission Act
(FTC) which does not provide for a private cause of action. This argument
was advanced on the following theory: The California statute was an
adopted version of the Model Act which was patterned after the FTC
Act. By analogy, since the FTC Act did not provide a private cause
of action, the court should not imply a private cause of action in the
California statute. The court rejected this argument because there was
no provision in the federal statute comparable to section 790.09, and
because the federal statute related "only to enforcement proceedings
brought by the Commission or the Attorney General, or the review
thereof."67
The defendant then attempted to limit the implied private cause of
action to insureds. The defendant argued that even if the statute provided
a private cause of action, that right did not extend to third-party
claimants because the violation of the act was comparable to a breach
of duty which runs only to the insured. 61 The court rejected that argument
by relying on the language of the statute and the legislative committee's
failure to make changes to the bill when the committee was informed
that the language "could be construed to affect third parties."69 The
court noted that "it is a reasonable implication that the committee's
inaction represented a deliberate decision that third-party claimants were
to enjoy the protection afforded by the bill."'70
Finally, the court rejected defendant's contention that the improper
conduct of the insurer was actionable only if it were committed with
such frequency as to constitute general business practice.71 The following
provision is considered to be an unfair and deceptive act or practice
under the statute:
66. Id. at 887, 592 P.2d at 334, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 846-47. The court dismissed the
evidence as not persuasive because the individual submitting the legislative intent was
not a legislator nor was he acting on behalf of the legislature during his testimony. The
court deemed other information offered as evidence too general and remote.
67. Id. at 887-88, 592 P.2d at 334, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 847 (quoting Holloway v. Bristol-
Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
68. 23 Cal. 3d at 888, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal Rptr. at 847.
69. Id., quoting a representative of the Department of Insurance testifying before
various legislative committees.
70. Id. at 889, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848. The court noted that the
language of the statute made use of the terms "claimant" and "insured." In some places
each word appeared alone and in some places both words appeared together. This ambiguity
was brought to the attention of the legislative committee considering the bill. However,
no changes were made "in spite of these concerns."
71. Id. at 890, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
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(h) knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate
a general business practice any of the following unfair claims settlement
practices.72
The court adopted the view that an insurer or claimant could prevail
under two alternative methods. He must either show: (1) that the act,
whether single and isolated or one of a series of acts, was knowingly
committed; or (2) that the act was performed with such frequency as
to indicate a general business practice."
The Royal Globe decision sparked much debate and controversy over
whether similar statutes provide a private cause of action.74 Generally,
critics complain that the decision is contrary to common law which
expressly denies the third party a cause of action against an insurer
without an assignment by the insured."
The reasons given by courts for rejecting the Royal Globe decision
often center around the specific language of the state statute. 6 For
example, in Scroggins v. Allstate Insurance Co.," an Illinois appellate
court refused to consider the opinion in Royal Globe because the
language of the Illinois statute differed from the California statute.
While the California statute allowed for civil liability "under any laws
of this State" [including the Unfair Practice Act], the Illinois statute
allowed for civil liability "under any other laws of [the] State.""8 In
Royal Globe, the California court interpreted the absence of the word
"other" as providing a private cause of action under that statute.79 The
Illinois court determined that its statute referred to liability under any
other laws of the state, and concluded that Royal Globe was inappl-
icable.H Instead, the court decided the case on common law principles.
Although the Scroggins court recognized that an improper claims
practice included a failure to affirm or deny liability on first or third
party claims, it refused to imply a private right of action for third
parties. The court accepted the common law view that the insurer's
72. Id. at 883 n.1, 592 P.2d at 331 n.1, 153 Cal Rptr. at 844 n.1 (quoting Cal. Ins.
Code § 790.03 (West 1979)).
73. Id. at 891, 592 P.2d at 336, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
74. S. ASHLEY, supra note 2 § 9:06.50, at 21; see generally Fowler, supra note 58,
at 640-61. Jones v. National Emblem Ins. Co., 436 F. Supp. 1119 (S.D. Mich. 1977).
75. Supra note 11.
76. See generally Krueger, supra note 11; McCorriston & Ito, supra note 11; see also
S. ASHLEY, supra note 2 § 9:04.50 for the grammatical differences between the California
statute and the Model Act.
77. 74 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 393 N.E.2d 718 (1979).
78. Id. at 1035.
79. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d at 885-86, 592 P.2d at 332-
33, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845-48.
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duty only runs to the insured, reasoning that "the statute would appear
to Ifave been enacted for the benefit of the insured, analogous to the
common law duty discussed above ... as well as to provide an admin-
istrative enforcement mechanism for the benefit of the public at large."'"
The language of the statute, however, suggests an intent to cover both
insureds and third parties."
The Scroggins court construed the right to sue an insurer very
narrowly. The court concluded that in light of the fact that common
law does not provide a direct cause of action for third parties, such an
action should not be implied without explicit legislative intent to provide
one. 3 Apparently, the court failed to note the distinction between the
common law breach of contract action and the statutory bad faith action.
The common law breach of contract action in the third-party context
is based upon the underlying contractual relationship between the insured
and the insurer. Such an action is instituted when the failure of the
insurer to protect the insured's interests results in a jury verdict which
exceeds the insured's policy limits." Assignment of the insured's interest
against an insurer allows a third party to sue the insurer only to the
extent by which the insured may have been liable to the third party
as a result of the insurer's bad faithss Without the assignment, a third
party would be left without a remedy for the bad faith actions of an
insurer.
Under unfair insurance practice statutes, the statutory language ex-
tends beyond the contractual duty to the insured. For example, Ohio
Revised Code Section 3901.20 prohibits any person, including all legal
entities, from engaging in any practice determined to be "an unfair or
deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance."' , Consequently,
a statute which expressly provides a cause of action for an insured is
a remedy available in addition to the insured's breach-of-contract remedy.
A statute allowing a third party a private cause of action is, generally,
the only remedy available to third parties.
Unlike the Scroggins court, a Montana district court, in Marzolf v.
81. Id. at 1034, 393 N.E.2d at 723.
82. ILLINOIS INSURANCE CODE Ch. 73 § 766.6," 154.6 (1988) provides: "Acts
constituting improper claims practice. Any of the following acts by a company, if committed
without just cause and in violation of Section 154.5, constitutes an improper claims
practice: a) knowingly misrepresenting to claimants and insureds relevant facts or policy
provisions relating to coverages at issue ...."
83. Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 74 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1036, 393 N.E.2d 718, 724
(1979). "While other unfair practices defined in the statute may refer to claimants, we
believe that a more explicit legislative intent to extend the duty to settle to third party
claimants should be required where imposition of such a duty would be in derogation of
so much common law." Id.
84. Comment, supra note 10; see also Allen, supra note 9, at 834-36.
85. Allen, supra note 9, at 834.
86. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3901.20 (Anderson Supp. 1988).
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Hoover,87 recognized the distinction between the contractual duty owed
to an insured and the statutory duty owed to a third party claimant
when it noted that "[tihe duty owed a third party claimant by an
insurer is akin to, yet distinct from, the fiduciary duty running from
an insurer to its insured.... The latter duty being a common law duty
attendant a contract of insurance."8 The statutory duty of an insurer
to a third party, therefore, should not be conditioned upon a contractual
relationship running to the third party from the insured. This duty
should exist where a statute creates a cause of action which does not
rely upon common law remedial rights.
The difficulty that courts in various jurisdictions are having is de-
termining whether the statutes imply a private cause of action. Sub-
sequent to the Scroggins decision, the third district appellate court in
Illinois held that there was no private right of action for either an
insured or a third party provided under the statute. 9 This split of
authority within the same jurisdiction is an example of the uncertainty
which follows when a statute does not expressly provide or deny a
private right of action.
Most courts have refused to imply a cause of action for third party
claimants because the language of the statute does not so provide. The
Iowa Supreme Court in Seeman v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,"
however, believed that "a private cause of action would be consistent
with the underlying purpose of the statute."98 Although the court con-
cluded that the statute did not provide a private cause of action, it
noted that such a provision would encourage injured parties to seek
enforcement of the statute and provide a deterrent against further
violations.92 In addition, a direct cause of action can serve valid public
interests such as decreasing the quantity of litigation and encouraging
settlement of claims.93 This view, however, has not been favored among
87. 596 F. Supp. 596 (Mont. 1984).
88. Id. at 599.
89. Van Vleck v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 128 Ill. App. 3d 959, 961, 471 N.E. 2d 925,
927 (1984).
90. Seeman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d 35 (Iowa 1982).
91. Id. at 41. The court believed that third parties were among the class protected
by the statute, and that a cause of action would exist if the legislature intended the
statute to provide a private cause of action.
92. Id. at 43.
93. See Jones v. National Emblem Ins. Co., 436 F. Supp. 1119 (S.D. Mich. 1977),
in which the court stated:
A direct cause of action by the injured person against the insurer serves the public
interest in a number of ways. First, it encourages the settlement of personal injury
claims ... eliminates the danger of the insured reaping a windfall from his own
wrongdoing by slipping away with and quickly dissipating the proceeds of a judgment
against his insurer ... [and] reduces the quantity of litigation required to discharge
the insured's liability on the underlying judgment. Id.
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courts or scholars; 4 and even California's liberal judicial system has
surrendered to the majority view by overruling Royal Globe.95
B. Refusal to Imply a Private Cause of Action
Moradi-ShalaP6 issued the death knell for Royal Globe nearly ten
years after it was decided. Constant criticism by courts and scholars of
the Royal Globe decision finally took its toll on California's highest
court. In Moradi-Shalal, the court announced that developments oc-
curring after Royal Globe required a reexamination of that decision.97
In overruling Royal Globe, the California Supreme Court adopted the
arguments that the defendant and the dissent had made nearly ten years
earlier. The action by the court not only affected third party actions
but first party actions as well. The court concluded that the legislature
did not intend to create a private cause of action for any individual
and that "developments occurring subsequent to our Royal Globe de-
cision convince us that it was incorrectly decided, and that it has
generated and will continue to produce inequitable results, costly multiple
litigation, and unnecessary confusion unless we overrule it.""g
While some may interpret the Moradi-Shalal decision as the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's belief that allowing a private cause of action
under the statute would create the adverse effects discussed in the
opinion, the majority dispels this interpretation quite clearly. The court
indicated that the California legislature had not yet "manifested an
intent to create such a private cause of action," and "nothing we hold
herein would prevent the Legislature from creating additional civil or
administrative remedies, including, of course, creation of a private cause
of action for violation of section 790.03." 99
Royal Globe and its progeny clearly illustrate the error in attempting
to redefine and clarify statutory law by second-guessing the intent of
the legislators in adopting statutes. Many jurisdictions have refused to
imply a private right of action regardless of the relationship between
the parties.?° In making this determination, the statute is generally
94. The court in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company has conveniently
listed a number of court cases and scholarly commentators which have rejected the position
taken in Royal Globe. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 46 Cal. 3d at 297-99,
758 P.2d at 63-65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 122-123 (1988).
95. Id. at 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 292, 758 P.2d at 60, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
98. Id. at 297, 758 P.2d at 63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
99. Id. at 305, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
100. See, e.g., Mavroudis v. State Wide Ins. Co., 121 A.D.2d 433, 503 N.Y.S.2d 133
(1986); Kurrus v. CNA Ins. Co., 115 A.D.2d 593, 496 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1985); Seeman v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d 35, 43 (Iowa 1982).
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interpreted as providing for enforcement only by the superintendent of
insurance or a similarly situated individual.'
In Ohio, where the Model Act has not been formally adopted, the
courts have refused to imply a private cause of action under Ohio
Revised Code Sections 3901.20 and 3901.21 and rules promulgated by
the Department of Insurance.' 2 Section 3901.20 prohibits insurance
companies from engaging in certain unfair and deceptive practices
defined in section 3901.21.13 The superintendent of insurance is au-
thorized by section 3901.041 to promulgate rules necessary to exercise
his powers under Title 39 concerning the conduct and practices of
insurance companies." Pursuant to that grant of authority, the De-
partment of Insurance promulgated Rule 3901-1-07(C) which defines
additional unfair practices not covered by section 3901.2115 The Ohio
unfair settlement practices act expressly provides a procedure for injured
parties to follow when they believe an insurer has committed an unfair
or deceptive act within the meaning of Ohio Revised Code section
3901.21 or rules promulgated by the superintendent of insurance"
In Strack v. Westfield Co., 7 an Ohio appellate court was faced with
whether to imply a private cause of action pursuant to Rule 3901-1-
07(C). The plaintiffs sued their insurer for bad faith as a result of its
refusal to honor a claim filed with the company when fire destroyed
their home. The plaintiffs argued that Ohio Administrative Code 3901-
1-07 created an implied private cause of action in favor of insureds. To
determine whether to infer a private cause of action, the court applied
the four-prong test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
Cort v. Ash:'
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly
providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff 'one of the
class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted' ... Second, is
101. See generally Krueger, supra note 11; McCorriston & Ito, supra note 11.
102. Strack v. Westfield Co., 33 Ohio App. 335, 515 N.E.2d 1005 (1986); Kimpel
v. Dairy Farm Leasing Co., Inc., C.A. No. WMS-86-8 (Ct. App. Ohio Jan. 9, 1987).
103. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3901.20 (Anderson Supp. 1988) states: "No person
shall engage in this state in any trade or practice which is defined in sections 3901.19
to 3901.23 of the Revised Code as, or determined pursuant to those sections to be, an
unfair or deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance ......
104. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3901.041 (Anderson Supp. 1988).
105. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3901-1-07 (1988).
106. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3901.22(A) (Anderson Supp. 1988) reads in part:
Any person aggrieved with respect to any act that the person believes to be an unfair
or deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance, as defined in Section 3901.21
of the Revised Code or in any rule of the superintendent of insurance, may make
written application to the superintendent for a hearing to determine if there has been
a violation of Section 3901.20 of the Revised Code.
107. 33 Ohio App. 3d 336, 515 N.E.2d 1005 (1986).
108. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create
such a remedy or to deny one? ... Third, is it consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?
... And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state
law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law.... 1o9
Applying three of the four prongs,"' the court found no legislative
intent that would create or deny a private cause of action. It further
determined that creating such a cause of action would be inconsistent
with the underlying purpose of the Act.' The court refused to second-
guess the legislature and imply a private cause of action, regardless of
whether the action is brought by insureds or third parties.
Similarly, the Michigan courts have also determined that no private
cause of action exists under the Uniform Trade Practices Act (UTPA).12
Section 500.2026 of the Michigan statutes, which governs the conduct
of insurance companies, contains no specific private cause of action
provision, and the courts have refused to imply one."3 In Bell v. League
Life Insurance Co.,"4 plaintiffs sought to strike certain provisions from
their policies as violative of the UTPA. The court held that "the UTPA
provides a comprehensive scheme of enforcement of the rights and duties
it creates, that the scheme of enforcement is exclusive, and that the
plaintiffs have no private cause of action arising from the provisions of
the Act.""' 5
Proponents of the private cause of action in the state of Kentucky
had no better luck than those in Ohio and Michigan. The history of
Kentucky statutory law reveals that legislators favored establishing a
private cause of action against insurers by third-party claimants through
proposed legislation which provided for a direct cause of action for
109. Strack v. Westfield Co., 33 Ohio App. at 337, 515 N.E.2d at 1007 (quoting
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (emphasis in original)).
110. The court noted that the fourth prong was inapplicable to state cases.
111. The Strack court, citing D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co.,
494 Pa. 501, 431 A.2d 966 (1981), stated:
The Department of Insurance was established in order to determine what insurance
practices were unfair or deceptive and how to best control them. The combination
of administrative remedies and civil penalties reflects the legislative solution to a
problem perceived by it. This court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
legislature, which could have easily expressly provided for such a remedy.
112. Bell v. League Life Ins. Co., 149 Mich. App. 481, 387 N.W.2d 154 (1986);
Young v Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 139 Mich. App. 600, 605, 362 N.W.2a 844 (1984).
113. Bell v. League Life Ins. Co., 149 Mich. App. 481, 387 N.W.2d 154 (1986).
114. 149 Mich. App. 481, 387 N.W.2d 154 (1986).
115. Id. at 485, 387 N.W.2d at 156. The court also noted that enforcement of the
Act was governed by M.C.L. 500.230 which allows a private individual a cause of action
against an insurer for the interest penalty imposed under § 2006 of the Act. Claimants,
however, cannot maintain a cause of action under the Unfair Trade Practice Act (M.C.L.
§ 500.2001-2050).
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injured third parties."6 Prior to passage of the legislation, however, the
language providing for this remedy was deleted."' Although Kentucky
seems to favor the recognition of a private cause of action on behalf
of persons injured by violation of state statutes,"' the removal of language
supporting a third party cause of action against an insurer indicates
that a private cause of action does not extend to third parties.
V. BALANCING INTERESTS
The unfair settlement practice acts enacted by states in response to
complaints of bad faith conduct by insurers is a valiant attempt to be
equitable and fair to all parties concerned. Some states have been more
aggressive than others in meeting the problem head-on with clear,
unambiguous statutory language and specific remedial rights for victims
of these unfair practices. Much more must be done to end the friction
between insurers and their insureds and between insurers and third
parties. Legislative changes should be considered which go to the heart
of the problem of third-party rights. Further, other methods of claim
resolution should be considered as an alternative to traditional judicial
channels. California has left the door open for a statute which expressly
provides a private cause of action to remedy misconduct against third
parties. Although insurers must act in the best interest of their insureds,
the duty of good faith and fair dealing can extend to third parties
without raising a conflict of interest issue.
A. Suggested Legislative Changes
Generally, state legislators have let the courts decide whether a private
cause of action exists under unfair settlement practice acts. The courts
have either refused to accept this responsibility and denied the private
cause of action unless legislatures expressly provides, or have attempted
to second-guess the legislative intent and either prohibited or implied
a private cause of action. Royal Globe provides a valuable lesson in
the pitfalls of second-guessing legislators. The simple solution to avoid
varying opinions and confusion about the availability of private causes
of action and the applicability of such an action to third parties is to
leave the decision with the legislature. The number of lawsuits initiated
to resolve the issue of whether a private right of action exists can be
significantly reduced by including one short sentence in unfair settlement
116. Underwood, Insurance, 72 KY. L.J. 403, 410 (1983). The author noted that
proposed legislation provided a direct cause of action for third-party claimants. (citing
H.R. 360, 1982 Reg. Sess. (introduced by Rep. Jim LeMaster) §1(5).
117. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-230 (Michie/Bobbs-Merill 1988).
118. Underwood, supra note 116, at 412.
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practice statutes either permitting or prohibiting a private cause of
action. If legislators refuse to allow a private cause of action, they
should at least provide for recovery of actual damages incurred by any
individual who has suffered because of a violation of the statute.
As one commentator suggested,119 legislators should stop passing the
buck and squarely address whether unfair settlement practice acts will
expressly provide or deny a private cause of action for violations by
insurers. This would necessarily require a further determination of
whether such an action, if allowed, extends to third-party claimants.
The statutory language of these statutes should be rephrased to the
extent that it clearly removes any ambiguity or doubt as to the legislative
intent.
B. Alternatives to Traditional Litigation
An apparent need exists for redress for persons injured as a direct
result of violations of unfair settlement practice statutes. In those states
which do not provide a private cause of action, the policing agency
must become more effective in prosecuting violators. Alternatively, an
individual injured as a result of the violations should be allowed to
bring a private action for damages directly against the insurer.
The increase in complaints against insurers must be met with an
effective remedy which reduces litigation and serves the interest of
insureds, third parties, and the insurance industry. Perhaps the refusal
to expressly or impliedly grant a private cause of action against insurers
represents a reluctance by the legislature to open the floodgates to
private actions against insurers for bad faith in their settlement prac-
tices.12' Undoubtedly, lobbyists trying to take the sting out of these
statutes are concerned about the possible monetary awards which would
result were private citizens allowed to present their case of bad faith
to a jury of their peers. "'
The concern for excessive jury awards can be alleviated by the creation
of a tribunal consisting of impartial individuals to review and assess
119. Id.
120. A dissenter in the Royal Globe case commented that allowing private cause of
action would increase suits against insurers who refuse settlement offers: "[I]n almost
every case in which an insurer hereafter declines a settlement offer the injured third
party claimant will be tempted to file an independent action against the carrier...."
Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 23 Cal. 3d 880, 898, 592 P.2d 329, 341, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 842, 854 (1979) (Richardson, J., concurring and dissenting), revd 46 Cal. 3d 287,
758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
121. See generally testimony of J. Robert Hunter, President, National Insurance
Consumer Organization Before the Subcommittee on Business, Trade and Tourism of the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, December 3, 1985. The
Economist (June 6, 1987). In response to the claim of insurance companies that jury
awards are escalating to abnormal heights, causing a crisis, Mr. J. Robert Hunter states:
"The crisis is within the insurance industry, not in the courts."
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damages in bad faith claims. The tribunal could work in conjunction
with the Department of Insurance and enforce the regulations promul-
gated by the Department with respect to unfair settlement practices.
Alternatively, the statutes could provide individuals with a private right
of action to be heard only through an organization such as the American
Arbitration Association.'1 Any decision by the arbitration panel would
be binding upon the parties. Each party in the arbitration would be
allowed to choose one or two arbitrators, and those arbitrators would
be required to choose from a list of "neutral" arbitrators.
Arbitration as an alternative to the traditional judicial dispute res-
olution system has been hailed as a faster, cheaper, and fairer method
of resolving disputes.12 The arbitration method will insure that both
parties' interests are fairly represented. The insurers need not be con-
cerned with facing a jury whose sympathies lie with the injured party;
while the injured party will have his "day in court" and an opportunity
to recover actual damages caused as a result of the improper conduct
of insurers.
Deborah F. Sanders
122. See generally Dispute Management Today & Tomorrow, Annual Report of the
American Arbitration Association 1986-1987. The American Arbitration Association (AAA)
is an impartial agency created to resolve disputes outside the judicial arena. Parties usually
agree to arbitrate through the AAA in contract provisions in the event a dispute arises
between the parties. The arbitration is governed by the rules of the American Arbitration
Association.
123. R. DE SEIFE, SOLVING DisPurrus THROUGH COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 101,
at 4 (1987).
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